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ANALYSIS OF SOLITAIRE
DANIEL SHIU
1. Introduction
The Solitaire cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier as a plot point in the novel Crypto-
nomicon by Neal Stephenson [3]. The cipher is intended to fit the archetype of a modern
stream cipher whilst being implementable by hand using a standard deck of cards with two
jokers.
1.1. Description of Solitaire. Solitaire is intended to match the design of other modern
stream ciphers. In such designs there is an internal state that varies with time st. There
is an update function U that takes states as inputs and returns them as outputs. There is
also an extraction function E which takes states as inputs and returns the next part of the
key stream. Given an initial state s0, future states are generated by the rule st+1 = U(st)
and key stream is extracted as kt = E(st) for t = 1, 2, . . . A diagrammatic representation
is given below.
s0 s1 s2 s3 · · ·U U U U
E E E
k1 k2 k3
In Solitaire the space of possible states is the space of permutations of 54 elements;
equivalently the state consists of the ordering of a deck of cards. This state space is over
237-bits in logarithmic size which is commensurable with modern stream ciphers. Solitaire
can move between a permutation on a deck of 54 cards and the numbers {1, 2, . . . , 54}
by naturally converting the card value to a number between 1-13 and then adding 0, 13,
26, or 39 depending on the suit being ♣, ♦, ♥, or ß (the (distinguished) jokers are taken
to be 53 and 54 in this paper, though in the specification both are labelled 53). Using a
permutation as state helps to derive a certain uniformity of the key stream: if the sequence
of states cannot be distinguished from random permutations and the extraction function
samples a single value uniformly from the permutation, then the returned key values should
be uniformly distributed across the set which is permuted. Moreover sampling from the
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permutation can also provide an index into the permutation itself, which again should be
uniformly distributed. One needs to be careful however: if the index is sampled from a
fixed position k and this value used without modification then this introduces a bias toward
k in the extraction (when the value k is in position k, it automatically extracts itself; in
other circumstances, the extraction will be flat across the space of permutations). Indeed
if the extraction functions S[f(S[k])] for any fixed function f and known value k, then one
should ensure that f(t) = k has no solutions or else a biased stream will be produced.
Nevertheless, indexing allows for more complex extraction functions which are uniformly
distributed across the permuted set.
This is the approach taken with Solitaire. If we write the state at the time of extraction
as the ordered set [S[1], S[2], . . . , S[54]] where the S[i] take distinct values from the set
{1, 2, . . . 54}, then the extraction function is given by E([S[1], S[2], . . . , S[54]]) = S[S[1]+1].
A slightly different approach is taken when S[1] = 54; in this case our indexing exceeds
the maximum and instead the key character S[54] is published (in the cipher specification
the label is 53 and we reach the same conclusion). This leads to a biased sample position,
but should preserve the uniform distribution of the key character rather than introduce a
bias towards 54. To put E in the context of our deck of cards, suppose the ordering of the
deck from left-to-right is given by:
K♦ 10♣ 4ß 6♣ 3♥ A♣ 2♥ jo A♦
Q♥ A♥ 8ß 6♥ 7♦ 8♥ 9♣ 6♦ 4♣
5♦ J♦ 2♣ K♥ 9♥ 7♥ Qß 7♣ 3♣
10♥ 8♣ 3♦ JO 2♦ J♣ Q♦ 8♦ 5♥
5ß Kß Aß Jß 10ß 4♦ 2ß 9♦ 5♣
10♦ 3ß J♥ K♣ 9ß 7ß Q♣ 4♥ 6ß
This can be converted to the numerical representation and the top card considered numer-
ically:
26 10 43 6 29 1 28 53 14
38 27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3
36 8 16 53* 15 11 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 46 12 30 45
in this case the number 26 (K♦). The extracted key value in this case is the 26th card
after the top card, which for this deck is 3 (3♣). The key stream produced is a sequence
of numbers in the range 1, . . . , 54. This is converted to the more useful key stream taking
values 1, . . . , 26 by ignoring instances 53 and 54 in the key stream (i.e. jokers) and otherwise
reducing modulo 26.
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26 10 43 6 29 1 28 53 14
38 27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3
36 8 16 53* 15 11 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 46 12 30 45
The update function U for Solitaire is slightly more complex, though again is intended to
be simple enough to implement manually. Firstly the joker corresponding to 53 (hereafter
the slow joker) is advanced one space in the deck (i.e. for i where S[i] = 53 apply the swap
(i, i+ 1)) and then the joker corresponding to 54 (hereafter the fast joker) is advanced two
spaces in the deck (i.e. for i where S[i] = 54 apply the swap (i, i + 1) and then the swap
(i + 1, i + 2)). If ever this requires us to perform a swap with position 55 (i.e. the joker
is the last card of the deck) then instead of a swap perform a single right rotation of the
last 53 cards or in cycle notation we apply (2, 3, . . . , 53, 1) (i.e. the joker is moved to the
position S[2] and all subsequent cards increase their index by 1). Here is an illustration of
the joker movement for our example:
26 10 43 6 29 1 28 53 14
38 27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3
36 8 16 54 15 11 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 46 12 30 45
26 10 43 6 29 1 28 14 53
38 27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3
36 8 16 15 11 54 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 46 12 30 45
The next stage of U is to perform a “triple cut”. Here all cards prior to the first joker
are moved to the end of the deck and all cards after the second joker are moved to the
beginning. In other words if the first joker occupies position i and the second joker position
j with i > j we apply the permutation
j + 1, j + 2, . . . , 54, i, i+ 1, . . . , j, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1
(note that this is not in cycle notation). Again in our example here is an illustration of a
triple cut:
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26 10 43 6 29 1 28 14 53
38 27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3
36 8 16 15 11 54 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 46 12 30 45
25 21 31 44 52 40 50 49 17
41 22 5 23 42 37 13 48 46
12 30 45 53 38 27 47 32 20
34 9 19 4 18 24 2 39 35
33 51 7 3 36 8 16 15 11
54 26 10 43 6 29 1 28 14
Finally we apply a “count cut”. Here we look at the last card of the deck S[54] whose
values we denote k. We then cut the first 53 cards so that the (k + 1)th card S[k + 1]
becomes the top card S[1]. In permutation notation we apply the permutation
k + 1, k + 2 . . . 53, 1, 2, . . . k, 54
(again note that this is not cycle notation). Similar to the extraction function, Solitaire
introduces a slight modification when S[54] = 54. In this case no modification is made
during the count cut step (in fact nor is any modification is made if S[54] = 53). Completing
our diagrams here is an example of the count cut:
25 21 31 44 52 40 50 49 17
41 22 5 23 42 37 13 48 46
12 30 45 53 38 27 47 32 20
34 9 19 4 18 24 2 39 35
33 51 7 3 36 8 16 15 11
54 26 10 43 6 29 1 28 14
37 13 48 46 12 30 45 53 38
27 47 32 20 34 9 19 4 18
24 2 39 35 33 51 7 3 36
8 16 15 11 53* 26 10 43 6
29 1 28 25 21 31 44 52 40
50 49 17 41 22 5 23 42 14
2. Empirical observations
It is easy to empirically test the statistical properties of the key stream for lengths of 232
characters. Freely available C implementations can generate this much key stream in a few
minutes on a laptop. Combining this with a randomly shuffled deck (based on entropy for
/dev/random) it is easy to confirm that the keystream is indeed uniformly distributed across
individual characters. However, as reported elsewhere [1], there is an empirically observable
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bias in the difference between consecutive key characters. It is again easy to confirm that
consecutive characters mod 26 are equal with probability roughly 0.0444 ≈ 1/22.5. One
can modify the program to directly output the keystream mod 54 and observe that the bias
towards equality here is about 0.0254 ≈ 1/39.5 which suggests that this is due to repeating
keycards rather than any interplay between values that differ by 26.
One can investigate repetitions at other short distances within the key stream and al-
though not as pronounced, empirical methods can detect a bias for characters even sep-
arated by as much as 26 characters. The exact bias at the various separations is plotted
below.
One can also count occurrences of repeated triples, four tuples and five tuples. These
occur with probability roughy 4.89× 10−4, 1.36× 10−5 and 6.81× 10−6 respectively. Note
that if we take the ratio of the first term with 0.0444 and the ratios of subsequent terms we
get 90.8, 36.0, and 2.0 rather than 22.5 (which we might expect one each case if occurrences
of the bias between consecutive terms were an independent event). Indeed, the occurrences
of triples and four-tuples are rarer than for a random stream.
2.1. Quantifying the threat of the main bias. One can quantify the risk of the most
significant bias. Using Shannon’s entropy function H we consider a stream of values mod
26 where after the initial character, the next character in the stream is identical to the
previous with probability ≈ 1/22.5 or is selected uniformly at random from the remaining
25 characters with probability ≈ 21.5/22.5. The entropy of each character after the first
in such a stream is given by
− 1
22.5
log
1
22.5
− 25 · 21.5
22.5
· 1
25
log
21.5
22.5 · 25
which is roughly 3.2577 if measured in the natural logarithm or 4.6999 if measured in bits.
These values should be compared to the entropy of a flat character stream mod 26 where
each character is selected independently and uniformly at random which is log 26 (roughly
3.2580 in the natural logarithm or 4.7004 in bits). Thus using only the information from
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the principal bias we conclude that Solitaire leaks information at a rate of 0.0005 bits per
character produced after the first.
Response to this rate of information loss will vary. The theorist cryptographer will hold
that any rate of information loss is unacceptable. A more pragmatic-minded cryptographer
might reflect that well-established methods of creating a stream cipher, such as a block
cipher used in CTR or OFB mode leak information at a rate of 2−B−1t2 after producing t
blocks of B bits of key stream (at least for values of t 2B). For short messages, at most
hundreds of characters long, this bias does not seem too harmful. For longer messages we
offer a couple of cautionary examples.
Suppose that Solitaire were used to secure logon credentials so that users repeatedly send
a user name and password encrypted under Solitaire (possibly re-keyed between sessions).
Suppose that the credentials are a total of 30 characters long, but are sent over 50,000
times. Counting the occurrences of all possible differences between the first and second
cipher text character in the set of 50,000 we expect difference to occur about 2222 times
owing to our bias. We expect other differences to be binomially distributed with mean
about 1911 and standard deviation about 42 so that a random difference occurring more
often than our bias is unlikely. Repeating the process for all the other differences gives us
very strong guesses for the difference between consecutive characters in the plaintext and
allows us to limit the possible user name and password to one of twenty-six choices which
are Caesar shifts of each other.
As another example, suppose a suspected dissident is accused of leaking a government
document using Solitaire and that the document is 10,000 characters. In their defence
the suspect produces an innocuous document of the same length. A cryptographic expert
witness could derive the key stream under each claim and count the repeats. The causal
case would be expected to have about 444 repeats in the key stream and the non-causal
around 385. The difference of 60 would represent more than 2 standard deviations, which
may constitute reasonable doubt dependent on the legal system and the member of the
judiciary1.
3. Explaining the main bias
A bias to repetition in the key stream is likely caused by a similarity of two consecutive
states causing the same extraction for the same reason. Here is one example of how such
a repetition might occur. Our story depends principally on the value of the top card, the
locations of the jokers and the value of the card which will become the bottom card after
our update. Consider the pack below where a key extraction has just occurred.The top
card, 3, causes the key card 6 to be indexed and published.
1Note for lawyers: it would be simple enough to construct a plausible message that leads to a causal-
looking key stream for any given cipher texts and so both parties would need to demonstrate that their
claimed message was produced independently of the cipher text.
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3 10 43 6 29 1 28 53 46
38 27 14 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 26
36 8 16 54 15 11 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 47 12 30 45
We now proceed to apply U by advancing the jokers, noting that the card to the left of
the first joker, 46, is designed to become our bottom card.
3 10 43 6 29 1 28 46 53
38 27 14 32 20 34 9 19 4
18 24 2 39 35 33 51 7 26
36 8 16 15 11 54 25 21 31
44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22 5
23 42 37 13 48 47 12 30 45
We now perform a triple cut which moves 46 to the bottom. We note that the order of
all cards between 3 and 46 is preserved.
25 21 31 44 52 40 50 49 17
41 22 5 23 42 37 13 48 47
12 30 45 53 38 27 14 32 20
34 9 19 4 18 24 2 39 35
33 51 7 26 36 8 16 15 11
54 3 10 43 6 29 1 28 46
We now perform a count cut. Due to the particular value of 46, this restores 3 to the
top card position as well as the subsequent cards up to 46.
3 10 43 6 29 1 28 25 21
31 44 52 40 50 49 17 41 22
5 23 42 37 13 48 47 12 30
45 53 38 27 14 32 20 34 9
19 4 18 24 2 39 35 33 51
7 26 36 8 16 15 11 54 46
If we now perform a second extraction we do of course recover the value 6 again.
We now consider the probability that this “story” occurs in a more generic fashion. The
conditions depend on four cards:
• The card at the top of the deck when the extraction is first made, call this the
dereferenced card (3 in our example),
• The card that moves to the bottom of the deck during the update, call this the
count card (46 in our example),
• The two jokers (53 and 54 in our example).
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In the case where the count card is passed by the slow joker we enumerate the conditions
for the 54 × 53 × 52 × 51 possible values of these cards that lead to such a phenomenon.
We consider the case where the slow joker is in position i before advancing and position
i + 1 afterwards. After moving jokers we require the count card to be in position i and
to take the value 55 − i. Now, if the fast joker is in a position greater than i + 1 after
joker movement (are 53 − i such positions), our dereferenced card will be restored to the
top of the deck, along with the i − 2 subsequent cards from the previous state. Thus if
the derefenced card is i − 2 or less in value, the same key card is extracted. If i < 29 all
values between 1 and i− 2 could potentially be assumed by the dereferenced card, but for
i ≥ 29 only i − 3 values are available as the dereferenced card cannot be 55 − i. For the
case where the slow joker passes the count card then, the probability of this phenomenon
is
1
54 · 53 · 52 · 51
(
28∑
i=3
1 · 1 · (53− i) · (i− 2) +
52∑
i=29
1 · 1 · (53− i) · (i− 3)
)
=
21800
54 · 53 · 52 · 51 .
Reasoning similarly for the fast joker there is another contribution
1
54 · 53 · 52 · 51
(
28∑
i=3
1 · 1 · (53− i) · (i− 3) +
52∑
i=29
1 · 1 · (53− i) · (i− 4)
)
=
20525
54 · 53 · 52 · 51 .
Our heuristic tells us to expect such an arrangement to cause a repeat in the key stream
roughly 42325/7590024 ≈ 0.0055764 of the time. If we denote this probability p and assume
that outside this scenario the chance of a repeat is 1/26, then we should expect to observe
a repeat rate of
p+
(1− p)
26
≈ 0.043823
which is indeed close to the observed repeat rate of 0.444. This would appear to explain
most of the bias and is borne out when we count the occurrences of the top card of the
deck on occasions when the extracted card is a repeat of the previous extraction:
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As our model predicts, repeats are most frequent when the dereferenced card is a small
value. Note also the slight kink in the graph between 28 and 29 corresponding to the
separation in our sums. The tail of this graph suggests an additional phenomenon around
jokers. It follows that there are likely to be other sporadic causal constructions.
One might wonder why this situation has such reduced effect if we look at extractions 2
time steps apart, or why it fails to propagate to longer runs of three, four or five repeats.
This is because the top card always ends directly after a joker following the triple cut. If
these are not then separated by the count cut, the joker will pass the former top card at
the next update and change the distance between the former top card and the extracted
card. Even if the top card is restored by the count cut, the joker will be in position 53. If
this joker is the fast joker, again the distance will be disrupted on the next update.
4. Modifications to reduce the bias
The story of the previous section explains how this particular design leads to a bias
towards repeats in the keystream. The more general design issue here is combination of
two effects:
• The update function U does not mix thoroughly,
• The extraction function E does not “avalanche” well.
By “avalanche” we mean the general cryptographic property that all small changes to the
input of a cryptographic function should be enough to render the output indistinguishable
from random. We note that it does not seem to be necessary that neither of these flaws
occur in a generic secure stream cipher. For example, a block cipher in CTR mode has a
very simple update function (incrementing a counter) and a block cipher in OFB mode has
a very simple extraction function (the identity); in both cases however the partner function
is (assuming that the block cipher design is well-designed) very strong indeed.
One can quantify the mixing U by using one of the many measures of the complexity
of a permutation. These include inter alia counting ascents, counting ascending runs, and
counting inversions. The issues within Solitaire however seem to be caused by U preserving
long stretches of the state (though possibly translating these). A sensible complexity
measure would therefore seem to be to count adjacencies. For a permutation pi on n
elements the number of adjacencies is the size of the set {1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 : pii+1 = pii + 1}.
The expected number of adjacencies for a random permutation is 1, but if a permutation
preserves a stretch r elements then the number of adjacencies is at least r − 1.
We consider the typical number of adjacencies changed by application of U . Advancing
a joker typically leaves 50 adjacencies intact 2. The triple cut leaves at least 51 adjacencies
intact, but the adjacencies removed were already affected by the joker movement. The
count cut leaves 51 adjacencies intact, there is some possible overlap with previous effects.
The overall application of U is therefore expected to preserve at least 45 adjacencies rather
than the expected 1 preserved by a “random” permutation. By this measure then, the
function U falls along way short of the mixing desired.
2If the joker is at the bottom of the deck, only two adjacencies are changed. The two joker advances
combined will typically leave 47 adjacencies intact, but possibly fewer.
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One could attempt to increase the level of mixing by applying the given update function
multiple times. The above analysis shows that at least 7 applications of U will be necessary
to expect at most one adjacency to be preserved. Although the adjacencies affected by
repeated application of U are probably not independent (consider the adjacencies affected
by joker movement), one can treat them as such. Following this line of analysis, one might
model the expected number of adjacencies preserved by s applications of U as 53(45/53)s
until this expectation drops below 1 (here we ignore the effect of an application restoring
an adjacency from the original state). This suggest that 25 applications of U should be
considered, an estimate approximately born out by diagram 2. However, applying the U
function 25 times between key extraction probably violates the desired design feature that
the cipher be easy to implement by hand.
The alternative is to modify the extraction function to avalanche better. At present the
E function depends on the value of only two cards and if these two cards maintain their
position then the extraction function behaves in the same way. A more complex extraction
function might involve more indexing. One might consider using the values of, say, both
S[1] and S[2] to generate an index from which to extract e.g. use the extraction function
S[S[1] + S[2]]. However, the chance of preserving both S[1] and S[2] is not much greater
than the chance of preserving just S[1]. In this case rather than repeats occurring from
a small value of S[1] repeats will occur from a small value of S[1] + S[2] (mod 54) which
is almost equiprobable (the distribution of S[1] + S[2] (mod 54) is slightly biased towards
odd values).
One could extract by adding another layer of dereferencing e.g. S[S[S[1] + 1] + 1]. This
does avalanche with the update much better. The sums from section 3 gain an additional
factor of (i− 3)/50, (i− 4)/50 or (i− 5)/50. Further layers of dereferencing have a similar
effect. Again the reduction in bias comes with an undesirable overhead for the user. One
also needs to be careful as iterated dereferencing can coalesce when S[54] = 53 or S[53] = 54
by the extraction rules of Solitaire (though the deletion of these key values will ensure that
the key stream is not polluted). Additional factors (54 − i)/55 could be applied to the
sums in section 3 if we add another joker, but again the reduction in bias comes at a cost
to the user.
Probably the best way to proceed is to lightly modify both the update and extraction
functions (making both of these of moderate complexity would appear to be a good principle
of stream cipher design). The question is how much complexity can be added before over-
burdening the user.
5. Cycle structure of U
Another objection raised by [1] is that the update function U in Solitaire is not bijective
due to the exceptional joker movement when the end of the pack is reached. The argument
is that the cycle structure of a random bijective map provides a greater likelihood of being
on a long cycle (the most likely outcome is to land on a cycle of length ∼ (1− 1/e)n for a
state space of size n) than a random map (where the most likely outcome is to coalesce to
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a cycle of length O(n1/2) after O(n1/2) steps). Short cycles lead to instances of repeating
key stream which is highly insecure.
In the case of Solitaire however the cycle structure of U is unlikely to be as bad as
a completely random map. The image of U is still very large (i.e. there are very few
states which cannot be reached by applying U to a different state) and exact counts can
be made of states with 0, 1, 2, and 3 pre-images (higher numbers of pre-images are not
possible). Analysis of random functions with particular configurations of pre-images can
be performed with the configuration model [2]. Under this model, the transition to the
random map “giant component” will happen when a significant proportion of states have
at least 2 pre-images. The U function is a long way from this condition and we should
expect it to behave very similarly to a random bijection.
Moreover, a non-bijective U means that if an internal state is recovered then earlier states
cannot necessarily be uniquely recovered and a modicum of forward security is provided.
6. Conclusion
We have found a model for repetitions in the keystream in the stream cipher Solitaire
that accounts for the large majority of the repetition bias. Other phenomena merit further
investigation. We have proposed modifications to the cipher that would reduce the repeti-
tion bias, but at the cost of increasing the complexity of the cipher (probably beyond the
goal of allowing manual implementation). We have argued that the state update function
is unlikely to lead to cycles significantly shorter than those of a random bijection.
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